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Abstract—We study the problem of achieving strong secrecy
over wiretap channels at negligible cost, in the sense of maintain-
ing the overall communication rate of the same channel without
secrecy constraints. Specifically, we propose and analyze two
source-channel coding architectures, in which secrecy is achieved
by multiplexing public and confidential messages. In both cases,
our main contribution is to show that secrecy can be achieved
without compromising communication rate and by requiring only
randomness of asymptotically vanishing rate. Our first source-
channel coding architecture relies on a modified wiretap channel
code, in which randomization is performed using the output of
a source code. In contrast, our second architecture relies on a
standard wiretap code combined with a modified source code
termed uniform compression code, in which a small shared secret
seed is used to enhance the uniformity of the source code output.
We carry out a detailed analysis of uniform compression codes
and characterize the optimal size of the shared seed.
I. INTRODUCTION
While cryptography is traditionally implemented at the ap-
plication layer, physical-layer security aims at ensuring secrecy
by taking advantage of the inherent noise at the physical-
layer of communication channels. The benefits of physical-
layer security are substantiated by numerous theoretical re-
sults [4], [5], in particular those related to the wiretap channel
model [6], which suggest that one can achieve information-
theoretic secrecy without sharing secret keys. Although early
works on physical-layer security were mostly restricted to
eavesdropping attacks under optimistic assumptions regarding
channel knowledge, and only established the existence of
codes for physical-layer security by means of non-constructive
random coding arguments, there has been much progress
recently. In particular, attacker models have been extended
to situations with limited channel knowledge, e.g., with com-
pound channels [7]–[11], state-dependent channels [12], [13],
or arbitrarily varying channels [14]–[16]; several explicit low-
complexity codes with strong information-theoretic secrecy
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guarantees have also been designed, for instance, based on
low-density parity check codes [17], polar codes [18]–[20] or
invertible extractors [21], [22].
Despite these recent advances, physical-layer security
schemes are yet to be integrated into communication systems.
One factor that may have hindered their adoption is the limited
attention paid to the cost of physical-layer security, assessed
in terms of the decrease in achievable communication rates,
and the additional resources required for its implementation.
In fact, if one hopes to deploy physical-layer systems, it
is reasonable to ask that their operation: i) be transparent
or at least compatible with upper layer protocols, ii) not
affect communication rates, and iii) not require additional
resources. However, most studies of physical-layer security
focus on the characterization of secrecy capacity, which is
always less than the capacity, thereby suggesting that secrecy
can only be achieved at the cost of reducing communication
rates; furthermore, most existing models and coding schemes
implicitly assume the presence of an unlimited source of
uniform random numbers to realize a stochastic encoder.
The objective of this paper is to revisit these assumptions
and to show that the cost of secrecy can be made negligible,
i.e., secrecy neither incurs a reduction in overall communica-
tion rate nor requires extra randomness resources. The crux
of our approach is to analyze the wiretap channel model
illustrated in Fig. 1, in which the encoder only uses a random
seed of vanishing rate. More specifically, the objective is to
multiplex a confidential source with a public source, while
maximizing the sum-rate of secret and public communica-
tion. The idea of multiplexing messages to achieve secrecy
already implicitly appears in the original work of Csisza´r
and Ko¨rner [23], and is explicitly formalized in [24]–[26];
however, our approach differs in that: (i) we relax the common
assumption that messages are exactly uniformly distributed,
which is unrealistic even if messages are compressed with
optimal source codes [27], [28]; and (ii) we consider a strong
notion of secrecy.
The main contributions of this paper are two source-channel
coding architectures that achieve information-theoretic secrecy
over this channel model. The first one, illustrated in Fig. 2(a),
is based on wiretap codes and requires a random seed of
negligible rate to compress the public source. The second one,
illustrated in Fig. 2(b), combines a wiretap code designed to
operate with uniform randomization with a modified source
encoder, which compresses data while simultaneously ensuring
near-uniform outputs. This second architecture is slightly more
restrictive than the first simply because it requires the encoder
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Fig. 1. Multiplexing of confidential and public sources. The confidential
source, V nc , must be reconstructible by the receiver and must be kept secret
from the eavesdropper. The public source, V np , should be reconstructible by
the receiver, and information may be leaked to the eavesdropper.
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(a) Architecture based on a modified wiretap code.
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(b) Architecture based on a modified source encoder.
Fig. 2. Proposed architectures to multiplex confidential source sequences
V nc and public source sequences V
n
p . Ud is a uniformly distributed seed,
whose length d is sub-linear in the code length n.
and the decoder to share in advance a small secret seed. For
both architectures the presence of a random seed at the encoder
is meant to obtain a nearly uniform source from the public
source, and is thus unnecessary if the public source is uniform.
Nevertheless, regardless of the architecture, a secret key for
authentication is required [29], [30]. While both architectures
achieve the same optimal performance, the former modifies
the physical layer of the protocol stack whereas the latter
modifies the application layer, which makes it much easier
to implement protocol changes. We also highlight that the
concept of uniform compression introduced and studied in
Section IV is of independent interest, as it can be used
in other security problems. For instance, in secure network
coding [31]–[34], security is typically obtained by injecting
uniformly distributed “packets” into the network, which the
destination nodes are able to decode along with the messages.
Similar to the compression of the public source with uniform
compression codes in Section IV, these uniformly distributed
“packets” in secure network coding could be replaced by
uniformly compressed public messages.
Our model initially presented in [1] is closely related to the
concurrent study [35] and the subsequent study [36], with jour-
nal versions [37], [38]. However, our model is not subsumed
by any of the models considered in [35], [37] or in [36], [38].
The main difference with [36], [38] is that we only allow
a vanishing rate of randomness to be used at the encoder
to account for all the resources required to achieve strong
secrecy. This assumption results in an additional constraint on
the rate of the public source, which is not accounted for by the
analysis of [36], [38]. We provide additional details on how our
achievability schemes differ from [36], [38] in Remark 1. Our
model also differs from [35], [37], as we consider non-uniform
sources instead of uniform messages, so the analysis in [35],
[37] does not apply. We further detail in Remark 2 how our
achievability schemes differ from those in [35], [37]. Because
of differences in the models considered, the two achievability
arguments we present are conceptually different from those
in [35]–[38], and shed a different light on how to implement
multiplexing.
Remark 1. In [36], [38], the authors analyze the trans-
mission over a wiretap channel of a common message S0
and multiple confidential messages S1, . . . , ST that may not
be jointly independent. Moreover, the encoder is allowed to
encode these T + 1 messages using a randomized encoder.
In our approach, we have two independent sources, which
when compressed losslessly but separately, yield two separate
non-uniform messages. One of these sources is confidential,
while the other is public and can possibly be leaked to the
eavesdropper. However, in the two architectures considered
in our work, the encoding is only allowed to use a random
seed whose length grows sub-linearly in the code length n.
This introduces a new constraint on the minimum rate of the
public source that is absent in [36], [38]. Furthermore, the
randomized encoding in [36], [38] uses a commutative group
structure, while our two achievability schemes use either (i)
typicality-based compression arguments to show that the Re´nyi
entropy of order 2 of the compressed public source approaches
its entropy (see Section III); or (ii) lossless compression codes
with near uniform encoder output that require a random seed
whose length grows as O(
√
n), where n is the code length
(see Section IV).
Remark 2. In [35], [37], the authors study the broadcast
channel with confidential messages and precisely analyze
the trade-offs among the rates of uniform secret messages,
uniform public messages, and uniform local randomness. In
contrast, we study a source setting in which non-uniform
confidential and public sources are transmitted over a wiretap
channel. We present two distinct achievability arguments in
Section III and Section IV for the proposed generalization
that do not naturally follow from the proof arguments in [35],
[37]. Despite similarities with the converse for our model, the
converse in [35], [37] does not directly apply to the setting
considered in Section IV because of the presence of a shared
seed. Therefore, for completeness a converse for our model is
provided in Appendix A.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we formally describe the communication model
under consideration. In Sections III and IV, we prove that
the two architectures shown in Fig. 2 achieve near-optimal
3performance, i.e., offer the same rate trade-offs as the com-
munication problem without security constraints. More specif-
ically, we show in Section III the existence of wiretap codes
that ensure secrecy with non-uniform randomization, while in
Section IV, we show how to render the output of a source
code nearly uniform. Section V concludes the paper with some
perspectives for future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Notation
Random variables, e.g., X , and their realizations, e.g., x, are
denoted by uppercase and lowercase serif font, respectively,
while alphabets, e.g., X , are denoted by calligraphic font.
Unless otherwise specified, random variables have finite alpha-
bets, and the generic probability mass function of X is denoted
by pX . Basic information-theoretic quantities, e.g., H(X),
I(X;Y ) are defined as in [39]. For two random variables X
and X ′ over the alphabet X , the variational distance between
X and X ′ is V (pX , pX′) ,
∑
x∈X |pX(x)− pX′(x)| . For
any  > 0, δ() denotes a positive function of  such that
lim↓0 δ() = 0. We also define Ja, bK , [bac, dbe] ∩ N.
B. Wiretap channel model
Let X , Y and Z be finite alphabets. As illustrated in
Fig. 1, we consider a Discrete Memoryless Channel (DMC)(X , pY Z|X ,Y × Z). The channel (X , pY |X ,Y) is the main
channel while the channel
(X , pZ|X ,Z) is the eavesdropper’s
channel. We assume that the transmitter Alice wishes to trans-
mit the realizations of two independent Discrete Memoryless
Sources (DMSs) (Vc, pVc) and (Vp, pVp). Both sources are to
be reconstructed without errors by the receiver Bob observing
Y n, while the source (Vc, pVc) should be kept secret from the
eavesdropper Eve observing Zn. Hence, we refer to (Vc, pVc)
as the confidential source and to (Vp, pVp) as the public source.
Definition 1. A code for Cn the wiretap channel consists of
the following.
• A deterministic encoding function fn : Vnc × Vnp ×q
1, 2dn
y → Xn, which maps n symbols of the confi-
dential source and n symbols of the public source to
a codeword of length n with the help of a uniformly
distributed seed of length dn bits;
• A decoding function gn : Yn → Vnc ×Vnp , which maps a
sequence of n channel output observations to n symbols
of the confidential source and n symbols of the public
source.
The performance of Cn is measured in terms of the average
probability of error
Pe(Cn) , P
[
(V nc , V
n
p ) 6= gn(Y n)
]
,
and in terms of the secrecy metric
S(Cn) , max
vnc ∈Vnc
V
(
pZn|V nc =vnc , pZn
)
.
Note that since we do not know the exact output distribution
of the source encoders, we impose a security constraint akin
to semantic security [22]. We also require the length of the
uniformly distributed seed to be sub-linear in n, i.e.,
lim
n→∞
dn
n
= 0.
Note that in our second architecture presented in Section IV
and depicted in Figure 2(b), we allow the seed to be shared
between the encoder and the decoder, in which case, the seed
is also an argument to the decoding function gn.
C. Source-channel coding theorem
Theorem 1. Consider a confidential DMS (Vc, pVc) and a
public DMS (Vp, pVp) to be transmitted over a wiretap channel(X , pY Z|X ,Y × Z). For any random variable Q over a finite
alphabet Q such that Q−X − Y Z, if H(Vc) +H(Vp) < I(X;Y |Q)H(Vc) < I(X;Y |Q)− I(X;Z|Q)
H(Vp) > I(X;Z|Q)
,
then there exists a sequence of codes {Cn}n>1 such that
lim
n→∞Pe(Cn) = limn→∞S(Cn) = 0. (1)
Conversely, if there exists a sequence of codes {Cn}n>1 such
that (1) holds, then there must exist a random variable Q over
Q with |Q|6 3 such that Q−X − Y Z and H(Vc) +H(Vp) 6 I(X;Y |Q)H(Vc) 6 I(X;Y |Q)− I(X;Z|Q)
H(Vp) > I(X;Z|Q)
.
Although the result might seem intuitive, the achievability
proof does not follow from standard arguments and known
results because of the use of vanishing-rate randomness at
the encoder. The main contributions of this paper are the two
achievability proofs detailed next, the first one in Section III
using the architecture of Fig. 2(a), the second one in Section IV
using the architecture of Fig. 2(b). Note that the converse
in [37] does not directly apply to the setting of Section IV,
because of the presence of a pre-shared seed. We provide a
detailed proof for the converse of Theorem 1 in Appendix A.
Remark 3. Unlike the capacity region of the broadcast chan-
nel with confidential messages, the information constraints in
Theorem 1 do not include an auxiliary random variable V
such that Q − V − X − Y Z. This result is not surprising,
as this extra random variable accounts for the addition of
artificial noise (channel prefixing) in the encoder, which is not
allowed by our model, as we require all encoder inputs to be
decoded at the receiver. The random variable Q is merely
a time-sharing random variable [1], [37]. Similar to [40,
Appendix C], it is sufficient to consider an alphabet Q such
that |Q|6 3 by Fenchel–Eggleston–Carathe´odory theorem.
III. CODING ARCHITECTURE BASED ON WIRETAP CODES
WITH NON-UNIFORM RANDOMIZATION
If one were to rely on known wiretap codes [6], [23] to
transmit the confidential and public sources, and meet the
strong secrecy constraint for the confidential source, one would
have to ensure that the randomization of the encoder could be
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Fig. 3. Wiretap channel model with non-uniform randomization.
performed with a nearly uniform source of random numbers,
measured at least in terms of total variation. If no reconstruc-
tion constraints were placed on the public source (Vp, pVp),
a natural approach would simply be to extract the intrinsic
randomness of the source [41] to generate nearly uniform
random numbers; this strategy happens to be optimal as shown
in [1, Proposition 1]. However, unlike the model in [1], the
present setting requires the reconstruction of the public source
at the receiver. Although lossless compression of the public
source might intuitively seem to solve the problem, it would
actually not lead to a uniform random number. As alluded to
earlier, [27] shows that lossless compression of a source at
the optimal rate does not necessarily ensure uniformity under
variational distance. In addition, for DMSs, [28, Theorem 4]
shows that there exists a fundamental trade-off between re-
construction error probability and uniformity of the encoder
output measured in variational distance. To circumvent this
limitation, we design wiretap codes that operate with a non-
uniform randomization.
A. Wiretap codes with non-uniform randomization
We start by studying the wiretap channel model illustrated
in Fig. 3, in which the objective is to encode a secret
message Mc ∈ J1, 2nRcK by means of a public message
Mp ∈ J1, 2nRpK; we do not assume that messages are uniform,
but we assume that the statistics of the public message Mp
are known to the encoder. We call the corresponding wiretap
code a (2nRc , 2nRp , n) wiretap code. In this case, we show
that secrecy is still achievable, but at a rate 1nH2(Mp), where
H2(Mp) denotes the Re´nyi entropy of order 2 and is given by
H2(Mp) , − log
 ∑
m∈J1,2nRpK pMp(m)
2
 .
Proposition 1. Let pQXY Z be a joint distribution that factor-
izes as pQpX|QpY Z|X . Then, if
Rc +Rp < I(X;Y |Q),
Rc < I(X;Y |Q)− I(X;Z|Q),
I(X;Z|Q) < lim
n→∞
1
n
H2(Mp),
there exists a sequence of wiretap codes {Cn}n>1 such that
lim
n→∞maxm P
[
Mˆc 6= Mc|Mc = m
]
= 0,
lim
n→∞maxm P
[
Mˆp 6= Mp|Mc = m
]
= 0,
lim
n→∞maxm V
(
pZn|Mc=m, pZn
)
= 0.
Proof: See Appendix B.
As shown in [1, Proposition 1], if one did not re-
quire the reconstruction of Mp, one could achieve se-
cret rates Rc as in Proposition 1, but with the con-
straint I(X;Z|Q) < limn→∞ 1nH(Mp) instead. In general,
1
nH2(Mp) 6
1
nH(Mp), and the penalty paid by using the
Re´nyi entropy instead of the Shannon entropy may be signif-
icant. The following example highlights an extreme example
of such a situation.
Example. Consider Mp ∈ J1, 2nRpK such that
P[Mp = 1] , 2−nαRp , P[Mp = i] ,
1− 2−nαRp
2nRp − 1 if i 6= 1,
where α ∈]0, 12 [ is a parameter that controls the uniformity of
the distribution. Note that
lim
n→∞
1
nH2(Mp) = αRp whereas limn→∞
1
nH(Mp) = Rp.
Consequently, the achievable rates predicted in Proposi-
tion 1 could be arbitrarily smaller than those in [1, Proposition
1]. Fortunately, a combination of a source code with a wiretap
code identified in Proposition 1 is sufficient to achieve the
optimal rate of Theorem 1.
B. Achievability of Theorem 1 based on wiretap codes with
non-uniform randomization
We first refine a known result regarding the existence of
good source codes.
Lemma 1. Consider a DMS (V, pV ). Then, there exists a
sequence of source encoders fn : Vn×
q
1, 2dn
y→ q1, 2nRny
and associated decoders gn such that
lim
n→∞Rn = H(V ), limn→∞
1
n
H2(fn(V
n, Udn)) = H(V ),
lim
n→∞P[V
n 6= gn(fn(V n, Udn))] = 0, lim
n→∞
dn
n
= 0.
Proof: We consider a typical-sequence-based source.
Specifically, let n ∈ N, let 0 > 0 function of n to be
determined later, and let T n0 (V ) be the set of 0-letter-
typical sequences of length n with respect to pV [39]. The
typical sequences are labeled vn(m) with m ∈ q1, 2nRny
and Rn , 1n log|T n0 (V )|. The encoder fn outputs m if the
input sequence vn = vn(m) ∈ T n0 (V ), otherwise it generates
m ∈ q1, 2nRny uniformly a random. Note that this uniform
selection when the realization of V n is atypical can be done
by a random seed Udn of appropriate size dn. Decoding
is performed by returning the typical sequence vn(m) cor-
responding to the received message m. By [39, Theorem
1.1], we know that P[V n 6= gn(fn(V n, Udn))] 6 δ0(n) with
δ0(n) , 2|V|e−n
2
0µV , µV , min
r∈supp(pV )
pV (r), where supp
denotes the support of a distribution, and Rn < (1+0)H(V ).
Hence, for any m ∈ J1, 2nRnK
pfn(V n,Udn )(m)
= P
[
V n = vn(m) or (V n /∈ T n0 (V )
and m is drawn uniformly from
q
1, 2nRn
y
)
]
56 2−n(1−0)H(V ) + δ0(n)|T n0 (V )|
6 2−n(1−0)H(V ) + δ0(n)
1− δ0(n)
2−n(1−0)H(V )
=
2−n(1−0)H(V )
1− δ0(n)
.
Hence, since for any discrete random variable X over X ,
H(X) > H2(X) > H∞(X), we have
nH(V ) > H(fn(V n))
> H2(fn(V n))
> H∞(fn(V n))
= − log(max
m
pfn(V n)(m))
> n(1− 0)H(V ) + log(1− δ0(n)).
We may choose 0 = n−1/2+b and b > 0.
Note that the encoder requires Udn to encode the non-
typical sequences. To mitigate this requirement, we apply
the encoder to b(n) sequences of length a(n), where a(n)
and b(n) are any integers such that a(n)b(n) = n and
limn→∞ a(n) = +∞ = limn→∞ b(n).1 Hence, the amount
of required randomness is negligible compared to n since
P[V a(n) /∈ T a(n)0 (V )] 6 δ0(a(n)).
In the remainder of the paper, we refer to the source codes
identified in Lemma 1 as “typical-sequence based” source
codes.
Going back to the setting of Section II-B, let us apply
Lemma 1 to both sources (Vc, pVc) and (Vp, pVp). Let  > 0.
There exists N1 ∈ N and two source encoder-decoder pairs,
denoted (f cn, g
c
n) and (f
p
n, g
p
n), respectively, such that for n >
N1, P
[
(V nc , V
n
p ) 6= (gcn(f cn(V nc )), gpn(fpn(V np , , Udn)))
]
6 .
We set Mc , f cn(V nc ) ∈
q
1, 2nRc
y
and Mp , fpn(V np , Udn) ∈q
1, 2nRp
y
. Note that we only need randomness for the public
source. If there exists a distribution pQXY Z that satisfies the
condition of Proposition 1, then, there exists N2 ∈ N and a
wiretap code with encoder-decoder pair (fn, gn) such that for
n > N2,
max
m
P
[
Mˆc 6= Mc|Mc = m
]
< ,
max
m
P
[
Mˆp 6= Mp|Mc = m
]
< ,
max
m
V
(
pZn|Mc=m, pZn
)
< .
Encoding the sources into codewords as
fn(f
c
n(V
n
c ), f
p
n(V
n
p , Udn)), and forming estimates from
the channel output Y n as Vˆ nc = g
c
n(gn(Y
n)), and
Vˆ np = g
p
n(gn(Y
n)), we observe that for n > max(N1, N2),
P
[
(V nc , V
n
p ) 6= (Vˆ nc , Vˆ np )
]
6 3 and for any vnc ∈ Vnc ,
V
(
pZn|V nc =vnc , pZn
)
6 . By taking the limit  → 0, we
conclude with Lemma 1 that a code for the wiretap channel
can be constructed provided
H(Vc) +H(Vp) < I(X;Y |Q),
H(Vc) < I(X;Y |Q)− I(X;Z|Q),
H(Vp) > I(X;Z|Q).
1A possible choice is a(n) , n1−λ and b(n) , nλ with λ ∈]0, 1[.
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Fig. 4. Source encoder and decoder with uniform outputs.
IV. CODING ARCHITECTURE BASED ON UNIFORM
COMPRESSION CODES
In this section, we develop a second optimal architecture.
As before, our objective is to circumvent the impossibility of
generating uniform random numbers with source codes [28,
Theorem 4], but this time by modifying the operation of the
source codes themselves. The approach to overcome this im-
possibility is to introduce a small shared uniformly distributed
random seed. The benefit of this second architecture is that
it only requires a modification at the application layer of the
protocol stack. However, the price paid is that the transmitter
and the receiver must now share a seed whose rate can be
shown to be made vanishingly small. This contrasts with our
first architecture in Section III for which the seed is not
available at the decoder.
A. Uniform compression codes
Consider a DMS (X , pX). Let n ∈ N, dn ∈ N, and
let Udn be a uniform random variable over Udn , J1, 2dnK
independent of Xn. In the following we refer to Udn as
the seed and dn as its length. As illustrated in Figure 4,
our objective is to design a source code to compress and
reconstruct the DMS (X , pX) with the assistance of a seed
Udn .
Definition 2. A (2nR, n, 2dn) uniform compression code Cn
for a DMS (X , pX) consists of
• A message set Mn , J1,MnK, with Mn , 2nR,
• A seed set Udn , J1, 2dnK,
• An encoding function φn : Xn × Udn →Mn,
• A decoding function ψn :Mn × Udn → Xn.
The performance of the code is measured in terms of the
average probability of error and the uniformity of its output
as
Pe(φn, ψn) , P[Xn 6= ψn(φn(Xn, Udn), Udn)],
Ue(φn) , V
(
pφn(Xn,Udn ), pUMn
)
,
where UMn has uniform distribution over Mn.
Remark 4. Uniformity could be measured with the stronger
metric U′e(φn) , D(pφn(Xn,Udn )||pUMn ), where D(·||·) is the
Kullback-Leibler divergence; however, by [42, Lemma 2.7],
Ue(φn) can be replaced by U′e(φn), if lim
n→∞nUe(φn) = 0,
which will be the case.
Definition 3. A rate R is achievable, if there exists a sequence
of (2nR, n, 2dn) uniform compression codes {Cn}n>1 for the
DMS (X , pX), such that
lim
n→∞
1
n
logMn 6 R, lim
n→∞
dn
n
= 0,
6S
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Fig. 5. Encoding/decoding scheme for Proposition 3. The encoder/decoder
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lim
n→∞Pe(φn, ψn) = 0, limn→∞Ue(φn) = 0.
Our main result in this section is the characterization of
the infimum of achievable rates with uniform compression
codes as well as the optimal scaling of the seed length dn.
In the following, we use the Landau notation to characterize
the limiting behavior of the seed scaling.
Proposition 2. Let (X , pX) be a DMS. The infimum of achiev-
able rates with uniform compression codes is H(X). This
infimum is achievable with a seed length dn = O(υn
√
n), for
any {υn}n∈N s.t. limn→∞ υn = +∞. Moreover, a necessary
condition on dn for a (2nR, n, 2dn) uniform compression code
to achieve H(X) is dn = Ω(
√
n), i.e., limn→∞ dn√n = +∞.
Proof: See Appendix C.
B. Explicit uniform compression codes
As a first attempt to develop a practical scheme for uniform
compression codes, we propose an achievability scheme for
Proposition 2 based on invertible extractors [43]. We start by
recalling known facts about extractors.
Definition 4 ( [43]). Let  > 0. Let m, d, l ∈ N and let t ∈
R+. A polynomial time probabilistic function Ext : {0, 1}m ×
{0, 1}d 7→ {0, 1}l is called a (m, d, l, t, )-extractor, if for any
binary source X satisfying H∞(X) > t, we have
V(pExt(X,Ud), pUl) 6 ,
where Ud is a sequence of d uniformly distributed bits,
pUl is the uniform distribution over {0, 1}l. Moreover, a
(m, d, l, t, )-extractor is said to be invertible if the input can
be reconstructed from the output and Ud.
It can be shown [43], [44] that there exist explicit invertible
(m, d,m, t, )-extractors such that
d = m− t+ 2 logm+ 2 log 1

+O(1). (2)
The following proposition shows that one can establish optimal
uniform compression codes using such invertible extractors.
Proposition 3. Let (X , pX) be a binary memoryless source.
For any R > H(X) and for any  > 0, the rate R can be
achieved with a sequence of uniform compression codes such
that
• the seed length scales as dn = Θ(n1/2+);
• the encoder φn : Xn × Udn → Mn is composed of
a typical-sequence based source code combined with an
invertible extractor as described in Figure 5.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Unfortunately, this scheme is not fully practical because it
relies on a typical-sequence based compression. To provide
at least one explicit and low-complexity example, we finally
develop a uniform compression code based on polar codes
for a binary memoryless source (X , pX), X , {0, 1}. Let
β ∈]0, 1/2[, n ∈ N, N , 2n, and δN , 2−Nβ . Let GN ,[
1 0
1 1
]⊗n
be the source polarization transform defined in [45],
and set AN , XNGN . For any set A , {ij}|A|j=1 of indices
in J1, NK, we define AN [A] , [Ai1 , Ai2 , . . . , Ai|A|]. In the
following, we denote the complement set operation by the
superscript c. We also define the sets
VX ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (Ai|Ai−1) > 1− δN} ,
HX ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (Ai|Ai−1) > δN} .
A polar-based uniform compression code is obtained by defin-
ing the encoding function φN as follows. Let U|HX\VX | denote
a sequence of uniformly distributed random bits with length
|HX\VX |. Then,
φN (X
N, U|HX\VX |) ,
[
AN [VX ], AN [HX\VX ]⊕ U|HX\VX |
]
.
Proposition 4. Let (X , pX) be a binary memoryless source.
Any rate R > H(X) is achievable with a sequence of polar-
based uniform compression codes such that the seed length
|HX\VX | vanishes as the code length grows unbounded. In
addition, the complexity of the encoding and decoding is
O(N logN), where N denotes the code length.
Proof: See Appendix E.
C. Achievability of Theorem 1 based on uniform compression
codes
The uniform compression codes of Section IV-A may now
be combined with known wiretap codes (as depicted in Fig-
ure 2(b)), whose properties we recall in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Adapted from [1, Proposition 1]). Consider a DMC
(X , pY Z|X , Y × Z), in which a message Mc ∈
q
1, 2nRc
y
is encoded by means of a uniform auxiliary message Mp ∈q
1, 2nRp
y
. If there exists a joint distribution pQXY Z that
factorizes as pQpX|QpY Z|X such that
Rc +Rp < I(X;Y |Q) (3)
Rc < I(X;Y |Q)− I(X;Z|Q) (4)
Rp > I(X;Z|Q), (5)
then there exists a sequence of wiretap codes {Cn}n>1 such
that
lim
n→∞maxm P
[
Mˆc 6= Mc|Mc = m
]
= 0,
lim
n→∞maxm P
[
Mˆp 6= Mp|Mc = m
]
= 0,
lim
n→∞maxm V
(
pZn|Mc=m, pZn
)
= 0.
Let  > 0. Going back again to the setting of Section II-B,
we encode the confidential DMS using a traditional source
7code as in Lemma 1, and the public DMS using a uni-
form compression code as in Proposition 2. The correspond-
ing source encoder-decoder pairs are denoted (f cn, g
c
n) and
(fpn, g
p
n), respectively, and we set Mc , f cn(V nc ) ∈
q
1, 2nRc
y
and Mp , fpn(V np , Udn) ∈
q
1, 2nRp
y
. We assume n large
enough so that
P
[
(V nc , V
n
p ) 6= (gcn(Mc), gpn(Mp, Udn))
]
6 , (6)
V
(
pMp , pUnRp
)
< . (7)
Under the conditions (3)-(5) of Lemma 2, which are met
whenever
H(Vc) +H(Vp) < I(X;Y |Q),
H(Vc) < I(X;Y |Q)− I(X;Z|Q),
H(Vp) > I(X;Z|Q),
for n sufficiently large there exists a wiretap code Cn with
encoder/decoder pair (fn, gn) so that for any mc, and for M˜p
distributed according to pUnRp , the uniform distribution overJ1, 2nRpK,
P
[
ˆ˜Mp 6= M˜p|Mc = mc
]
< , (8)
P
[
ˆ˜Mc 6= Mc|Mc = mc
]
< , (9)
V
(
p˜Zn|Mc=mc , p˜Zn
)
6 , (10)
where ( ˆ˜Mp,
ˆ˜Mc) is the estimate of (M˜p,Mc) by the decoder
of Cn, and for any zn, mc, mp,
p˜ZnMcMP (z
n,mc,mp)
, pZn|Mc=mc,Mp=mp(zn)pMc(mc)pUnRp (mp).
Note that (8)-(10) holds by Lemma 2 because we have
assumed M˜p uniformly distributed. We now study the con-
sequences of using the wiretap code Cn with Mp (not exactly
uniformly distributed) instead of M˜p. Specifically, we note
(Mˆp, Mˆc) the resulting estimate of (Mp,Mc) by the decoder
of Cn, and define for any zn, mc, mp,
pZnMcMP (z
n,mc,mp)
, pZn|Mc=mc,Mp=mp(zn)pMc(mc)pMp(mp).
We then have for any mc,
V
(
pZn|Mc=mc , pZn
)
(a)
6 V
(
pZn|Mc=mc , p˜Zn|Mc=mc
)
+ V
(
p˜Zn|Mc=mc , p˜Zn
)
+ V (p˜Zn , pZn)
(b)
6 + V
(
pZn|Mc=mc , p˜Zn|Mc=mc
)
+ V (p˜Zn , pZn)
(c)
6 +
∑
zn
∑
mp
(
pZn|Mc=mc,Mp=mp(z
n)
×|pMp(mp)− pUnRp (mp)|
)
+ V (p˜Zn , pZn)
= + V
(
pMp , pUnRp
)
+ V (p˜Zn , pZn)
(d)
6 2+ V (p˜Zn , pZn)
(e)
6 2+
∑
zn
∑
mc,mp
(
pMc(mc)pZn|Mc=mc,Mp=mp(z
n)
× |pMp(mp)− pUnRp (mp)|
)
= 2+ V
(
pMp , pUnRp
)
(f)
6 3, (11)
where (a), (c), and (e) follow by the triangle inequality, (b)
holds by (10), (d) and (f) hold by (7).
Consider then an optimal coupling [46] between Mp and
M˜p such that P[E ] = V(pMp , pUnRp ), where E , {Mp 6=
M˜p}. We have for any mc,
P
[
Mˆp 6= Mp|Mc = mc
]
= P
[
Mˆp 6= Mp|Mc = mc, Ec
]
P [Ec]
+ P
[
Mˆp 6= Mp|Mc = mc, E
]
P [E ]
6 P
[
Mˆp 6= Mp|Mc = mc, Ec
]
+ P [E ]
= P
[
Mˆp 6= Mp|Mc = mc, Ec
]
+ V(pMp , pUnRp )
= P
[
ˆ˜Mp 6= M˜p|Mc = mc
]
+ V(pMp , pUnRp )
6 2,
where the last inequality follows from (7) and (8). Similarly,
using (7) and (9), we have for any mc,
P
[
Mˆc 6= Mc|Mc = mc
]
6 2.
Encoding the sources into codewords with Cn as
fn(f
c
n(V
n
c ), f
p
n(V
n
p , Udn)), and forming estimates from the
channel output Y n as Vˆ nc , gcn(gn(Y n)), and Vˆ np ,
gpn(gn(Y
n), Udn), we obtain again
P
[
(V nc , V
n
p ) 6= (Vˆ nc , Vˆ np )
]
6 P
[
(V nc , V
n
p ) 6= (Vˆ nc , Vˆ np )|(Mˆp, Mˆc) = (Mp,Mc)
]
+ P
[
(Mˆp, Mˆc) 6= (Mp,Mc)
]
6 5.
For any vnc ∈ Vnc , we also have
V
(
pZn|V nc =vnc , pZn
)
(a)
6
∑
mc
pMc|V nc =vnc (mc)V
(
pZn|Mc=mc,V nc =vnc , pZn
)
(b)
=
∑
m
pMc|V nc =vnc (mc)− V
(
pZn|Mc=mc , pZn
)
6 3,
where (a) follows by the triangle inequality, (b) holds because
Zn →Mc → V nc . Since  > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily small,
we obtain again the achievability part of Theorem 1.
8V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed and analyzed two coding architectures
for multiplexing confidential and public messages and achieve
information-theoretic secrecy over the wiretap channel. Our
first architecture relies on wiretap codes that do not require
uniform randomization, while the second architecture exploits
compression codes that output nearly uniform messages. By
showing that secrecy can be achieved with only vanishing-rate
randomness resources, and without reducing the overall rate
of reliable communication, the proposed architectures establish
that secrecy can be achieved at negligible cost.
An important issue that we have not addressed is the design
of universal wiretap codes that merely require that the public
message carries enough randomness, and do not require the
knowledge of the statistics. Some results in this direction are
already available in [38]. Finally, the design of actual codes
for the proposed architecture remains an important avenue for
future research.
APPENDIX A
CONVERSE OF THEOREM 1
We consider the problem described in Section II-B when
the uniformly distributed seed is shared between the encoder
and the decoder, as it is the case in Section IV. Obviously, the
converse will also hold when the seed is not available at the de-
coder, as it is the case in Section III. We develop our converse
following techniques similar to Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [23] and
Oohama and Watanabe [37]. Although the ideas are similar,
the converse does not follow directly from these known results
because of the presence of a seed with length dn. Formally,
consider two sources (Vc, pVc) and (Vp, pVp) that can be
transmitted reliably and secretly. Then, there exists a code with
block length n such that
P ((Vˆ nc , Vˆ
n
p ) 6= (V nc , V np )) 6 ′n (reliability), (12)
I(V nc ;Z
n) 6 δn (secrecy), (13)
dn/n 6 µn (sub-linear seed rate), (14)
where limn→∞ ′n = limn→∞ δn = limn→∞ µn = 0. We also
define n = ′n + 1/n. Consequently,
H(V nc )
(a)
= H(V nc V
n
p )−H(V np )
= I(V nc V
n
p ;Y
nUdn) +H(V
n
p V
n
c |Y nUdn)−H(V np )
(b)
6 I(V nc V np ;Y nUdn) + nn −H(V np )
6 I(V nc V np ;Y nUdn) + nn − I(V np ;Zn|V nc )
(c)
6 I(V nc V np ;Y nUdn) + nn − I(V np V nc ;Zn) + nδn
6 I(V nc V np ;Y n)− I(V np V nc ;Zn) + nn + nδn + dn,
(15)
where (a) holds by the independence of the sources, (b) holds
by (12) and Fano’s inequality, (c) holds by (13). Next,
H(V np ) + nµn > H(V np ) + dn
(a)
= H(V np Udn)
(b)
= H(V np Udn |V nc )
(c)
> H(Xn|V nc )
> I(Xn;Zn|V nc )
(d)
> I(XnV nc ;Zn)− nδn
(e)
> I(Xn;Zn)− nδn, (16)
where (a) and (b) hold by independence of the sources and
the seed, (c) holds because Xn is a function of V np , Udn , V
n
c ,
(d) holds by (13), (e) holds because V nc −Xn −Zn forms a
Markov chain. Similarly,
H(V nc ) +H(V
n
p )
(a)
= H(V np V
n
c |Udn)
= I(V np V
n
c ;Y
n|Udn) +H(V np V nc |Y nUdn)
(b)
6 I(V np V nc ;Y n|Udn) + nn
6 I(V np V nc Udn ;Y n) + nn, (17)
where (a) holds by independence of the sources and the seed,
(b) holds by (12) and Fano’s inequality. Finally,
nµn
(a)
> dn
(b)
= H(Udn)
> H(Udn |V nc V np )
(c)
> H(Xn|V nc V np )
> I(Xn;Zn|V nc V np ), (18)
where (a) holds by (14), (b) holds by uniformity of the seed,
(c) holds because Xn is a function of V np , Udn , V
n
c . The single
letterization is obtained by introducing a random variable I
uniformly distributed over J1, nK and defining
Qi = (Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1), Vi = (Qi, V
n
c , V
n
p ),
Q = (QI , I), V = (VI , I),
X = XI , Y = YI , Z = ZI .
Note that the joint distribution of Q,V,X, Y, Z factorizes as
pQpV |QpX|VWY Z|X . Then, using Csisza´r’s sum-equality
I(V nc V
n
p ;Y
n)− I(V np V nc ;Zn)
6
n∑
i=1
[
I(V nc V
n
p ;Yi|Y i−11 )− I(V np V nc ;Zi|Zni+1)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(V nc V
n
p ;Yi|Y i−11 Zni+1)− I(V np V nc ;Zi|Y i−11 Zni+1)
]
= n[I(V ;Y |Q)− I(V ;Z|Q)]. (19)
In addition,
I(Xn;Zn|V nc V np )
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Zi|Zi+11 V nc V np )−H(Zi|Zi+11 XnV nc V np )
]
>
n∑
i=1
[
H(Zi|Y i−11 Zi+11 V nc V np )−H(Zi|Zi+11 Y i−11 XiV nc V np
]
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi|Zi+11 Y i−11 V nc V np )
9= nI(X;Z|V ), (20)
where the inequality holds because Zi − Xi −
Zi+11 Y
i−1
1 X
nV nc V
n
p forms a Markov chain. Similarly,
I(Xn;Zn) =
n∑
i=1
(
H(Zi|Zni+1)−H(Zi|Zni+1Xn)
)
=
n∑
i=1
(
H(Zi|Zni+1Y i−11 )−H(Zi|XiZni+1Y i−11 )
)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi|Qi)
= nI(X;Z|Q). (21)
Finally,
I(V np V
n
c Udn ;Y
n)
=
n∑
i=1
I(V np V
n
c Udn ;Yi|Y i−11 )
6
n∑
i=1
I(V np V
n
c UdnY
i−1
1 Z
n
i+1;Yi)
=
n∑
i=1
I(XiY
i−1
1 Z
n
i+1;Yi)
=
n∑
i=1
I(XiQi;Yi)
= nI(XQ;Y )
= nI(X;Y |Q), (22)
where the second equality holds because Xi is a function
of V np , Udn , V
n
c and Yi − Zni+1Y i−11 Xi − V nc V np Udn forms
a Markov chain. Combining (15) – (22) we obtain
H(Vc) 6 I(V ;Y |Q)− I(V ;Z|Q) + n + δn + µn
H(Vp) + µn > I(X;Z|Q)
H(Vc) +H(Vp) 6 I(X;Y |Q) + n
µn > I(X;Z|V ).
Note that using pQVXY Z = pQpV |QpX|VWpY Z|X we have
I(V ;Z|Q) = I(V X;Z|Q)− I(X;Z|QV )
= I(X;Z|Q) + I(V ;Z|QX)− I(X;Z|V )
> I(X;Z|Q)− µn,
and
I(V ;Y |Q) 6 I(V X;Y |Q)
= I(X;Y |Q) + I(V ;Y |QX)
= I(X;Y |Q).
Hence, we must have
H(Vc) 6 I(X;Y |Q)− I(X;Z|Q)+n+δn+2µn,
H(Vp) > I(X;Z|Q)− µn,
H(Vc) +H(Vp) 6 I(X;Y |Q) + n.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We fix a joint distribution pQX on Q × X such
that2 I(X;Z|Q) 6 limn→∞ 1nH2(Mp) and I(X;Y |Q) −
I(X;Z|Q) > 0. Let  > 0, R0 > 0, and n ∈ N.
We randomly construct a sequence of codes {Cn}n∈N as
follows. We generate 2nR0 sequences independently at random
according to pQ, which we label qn(i) for i ∈ J1, 2nR0K.
For each sequence qn(i), we generate 2n(Rc+Rp) sequences
independently a random according to pX|Q, which we label
xn(i, j, s) with j ∈ J1, 2nRcK and s ∈ J1, 2nRpK. To transmit
a message i ∈ J1, 2nR0K and j ∈ J1, 2nRcK, the transmitter
obtains a realization s of the public message Mp ∈ J1, 2nRpK,
and transmits xn(i, j, s) over the channel. Upon receiving yn,
Bob decodes i as the received index if it is the unique one such
that (qn(i), yn) ∈ T n (QY ); otherwise he declares an error.
Bob then decodes (j, s) as the other pair of indices if it is
the unique one such that (qn(i), xn(i, j, s), yn) ∈ T n (QXY ).
Similarly, upon receiving zn, Eve decodes i as the received
index if it is the unique one such that (qn(i), zn) ∈ T n (QZ);
otherwise she declares an error. For a particular code Cn,
we note Pe(Cn) the probability that Bob does not recover
correctly (i, j, s) and that Eve does not recover correctly i.
Lemma 3. If R0 < I(Q;Y ) and Rc+Rp < I(X;Y |Q), then
E[Pe(Cn)] 6 2−αn for some α > 0.
Proof: The proof follows from a standard random coding
argument and is omitted.
Lemma 4. If lim
n→∞
1
n
H2(Mp) > I(X;Z|Q), then we have
ECn [V(pMcZn , pMcpZn)] 6 2−βn for some β > 0 and all
n ∈ N sufficiently large.
Proof: The proof relies on a careful analysis and mod-
ification of the “cloud-mixing” lemma [47]. Let  > 0. For
clarity, we denote here pˆQnXnZn the joint distribution of
(Qn, Xn, Zn) induced by the code, as opposed to pQnXnZn
defined as
pQnXnZn(q
n, xn, zn) = pZn|Xn(zn|xn)pXnQn(xn, qn).
First note that the variational distance V(pˆMcZn , pMc pˆZn) can
be bounded as follows.
V(pˆMcZn , pMc pˆZn)
6 V(pˆMcQnZn , pMc pˆQnZn)
= EQnMc
[
V(pˆZn|McQn , pˆZn|Qn)
]
6 EQnMc
[
V(pˆZn|McQn , pZn|Qn) + V(pZn|Qn , pˆZn|Qn)
]
6 2EQnMc
[
V(pˆZn|McQn , pZn|Qn)
]
Then, let Qn1 be the sequence in Qn corresponding to M0 = 1.
By symmetry of the random code construction, the average
of the variational distance V(pˆMcZn , pMc pˆZn) over randomly
generated codes Cn satisfies
ECn [V(pˆMcZn , pMc pˆZn)]
2If such a probability distribution does not exist the result of Lemma 1 is
trivial and there is nothing to prove.
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6 2ECn
[
V(pˆZn|Qn=Qn1Mc=1, pZn|Qn=Qn1 )
]
,
where
pˆZn|Qn=Qn1Mc=1(z
n) =
2nRp∑
k=1
pZn|Xn(zn|xn(1, 1, k))pMp(k).
The average over the random codes can be split between the
average of Qn1 and the random code Cn(q
n
1 ) for a fixed value
of qn1 , so that
ECn
[
V(pˆZn|Qn=Qn1Mc=1, pZn|Qn=Qn1 )
]
=
∑
qn1 ∈Qn
pQn(q
n
1 )ECn(qn1 )
[
V(pˆZn|Qn=qn1Mc=1, pZn|Qn=qn1 )
]
6
∑
qn1 ∈T n (U)
pUn(q
n
1 )ECn(qn1 )
[
V(pˆZn|Qn=qn1Mc=1, pZn|Qn=qn1 )
]
+ 2P [Qn /∈ T n (Q)] ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the varia-
tional distance is always less than 2. The first term on the right-
hand side vanishes exponentially with n, and we now proceed
to bound the expectation in the second term following [47].
First note that, for any zn ∈ Zn,
ECn(qn1 )
[
pˆZn|Qn=qn1Mc=1(z
n)
]
= ECn(qn1 )
2nRp∑
k=1
pZn|Xn(zn|xn(1, 1, k))pMp(k)

=
2nRp∑
k=1
ECn(qn1 )
[
pZn|Xn(zn|xn(1, 1, k))
]
pMp(k)
= pZn|Qn=qn1 (z
n).
We now let 1 denote the indicator function and we define
p(1)(zn) ,
2nRp∑
k=1
pZn|Xn(zn|xn(1, 1, k))pMp(k)
× 1{(xn(1, 1, k), zn) ∈ T n2(XZ|qn1 )},
p(2)(zn) ,
2nRp∑
k=1
pZn|Xn(zn|xn(1, 1, k))pMp(k)
× 1{(xn(1, 1, k), zn) /∈ T n2(XZ|qn1 )},
so that we can upper bound V(pˆZn|Qn=qn1Mc=1, pZn|Qn=qn1 )
as
V(pˆZn|Qn=qn1Mc=1, pZn|Qn=qn1 )
6
∑
zn /∈T n2(Z|qn1 )
∣∣pˆZn|Qn=qn1Mc=1(zn)− pZn|Qn=qn1 (zn)∣∣
(23)
+
∑
zn∈T n2(Z|qn1 )
∣∣∣p(1)(zn)− E [p(1)(zn)]∣∣∣ (24)
+
∑
zn∈T n2(Z|qn1 )
∣∣∣p(2)(zn)− E [p(2)(zn)]∣∣∣ . (25)
Taking the expectation of the term in (23) over Cn(qn1 ), we
obtain
E
 ∑
zn /∈T n2(Z|qn1 )
∣∣pˆZn|Qn=qn1Mc=1(zn)− pZn|Qn=qn1 (zn)∣∣

6
∑
zn /∈T n2(Z|qn1 )
E
[
pˆZn|Qn=qn1Mc=1(z
n) + pZn|Qn=qn1 (z
n)
]
= 2
∑
zn /∈T n2(Z|qn1 )
pZn|Qn=qn1 (z
n),
which vanishes exponentially fast as n goes to infinity for
qn1 ∈ T n (Q). Similarly, taking the expectation of the term
in (25) over Cn(qn1 ), we obtain
E
 ∑
zn∈T n2(Z|qn1 )
∣∣∣p(2)(zn)− E [p(2)(zn)]∣∣∣

6 E
[ ∑
zn∈Zn
∣∣∣p(2)(zn)− E [p(2)(zn)]∣∣∣]
6 2
∑
zn∈Zn
E
[
p(2)(zn)
]
=
∑
zn∈Zn
E
[
pZn|Xn(zn|Xn(1, 1, 1))
× 1{(Xn(1, 1, 1), zn) /∈ T n2(XZ|qn1 )}]
=
∑
(xn,zn)/∈T n2(XZ|qn1 )
pZnXn|Qn=qn1 (z
n, xn),
which vanishes exponentially fast with n. Finally, we focus
on the expectation of the term in (24) over Cn(qn1 ). For z
n ∈
T n2(Z|qn1 ), Jensen’s inequality and the concavity of x 7→
√
x
guarantee that
E
[∣∣∣p(1)(zn)− E [p(1)(zn)]∣∣∣] 6√Var (p(1)(zn)).
In addition,
Var
(
p(1)(zn)
)
=
2nRp∑
k=1
pMp(k)
2Var
(
pZn|Xn(zn|Xn(1, 1, k))
× 1{(Xn(1, 1, k), zn) ∈ T n2(XZ|qn1 )})
Note that
Var
(
pZn|Xn(zn|Xn(1, 1, k))
× 1{(Xn(1, 1, k), zn) ∈ T n2(XZ|qn1 )})
6
∑
xn∈Xn
pXn|Qn=qn1 (x
n)
(
pZn|Xn(zn|xn)
× 1{(xn, zn) ∈ T n2(XZ|qn1 )})2
=
∑
xn:(xn,zn)∈T n2(XZ|qn1 )
pXn|Qn=qn1 (x
n)pZn|Xn(zn|xn)2
(a)
6 2−n(H(Z|X)−δ())
×
∑
xn:(xn,zn)∈T n2(XZ|qn1 )
pXn|Qn=qn1 (x
n)pZn|Xn(zn|xn)
6 2−n(H(Z|X)−δ())pZn|Qn=qn1 (z
n)
(b)
6 2−n(H(Z|X)+H(Z|Q)−δ()),
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where (a) and (b) follow from the AEP; therefore,
Var
(
p(1)(zn)
)
6 2−n(H(Z|X)+H(Z|Q)−δ())
2nRp∑
k=1
pMp(k)
2
6 2−n(H(Z|X)+H(Z|Q)−δ())+
H2(Mp)
n .
and ∑
zn∈T n2(Z|qn1 )
E
[∣∣∣p(1)(zn)− E [p(1)(zn)]∣∣∣]
6 2nH(Z|Q)2−n2 (H(Z|X)+H(Z|Q)−δ()+
H2(Mp)
n )
= 2−
n
2 (
H2(Mp)
n −I(X;Z|Q)−δ())
Hence, if limn→∞ 1nH2(Mp) > I(X;Z|Q) + δ(), the sum
vanishes as n goes to infinity, which concludes the proof.
We point out that a generalized version of Lemma 4 may
now be found in [38]; in fact, [38, Theorem 14] develops a
general exponential bound on the secrecy metric, and a close
inspection of their result shows a tighter exponent involves the
Re´nyi entropy of order 1 + ρ with ρ ∈ [0, 1] in place of the
Re´nyi entropy of order 2. Actually, [48] shows that this is the
best exponent with random codes.
Using Markov’s inequality, we conclude that there ex-
ists at least one code Cn satisfying the rate inequalities in
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, such that Pe(Cn) 6 3 · 2−αn and
V(pMcM0Zn , pMcpM0Zn) 6 3 · 2−βn. We now define
P1(m) , P
[
Mc 6= Mˆc|Mc = m
]
,
P2(m) , P
[
Mp 6= Mˆp|Mc = m
]
,
S(m) = V(pZn|Mc=m, pZn).
Since E[P1(Mc)] 6 2−αn, E[P2(Mc)] 6 2−αn, and
E[S(Mc)] 6 2−βn, we conclude with Markov’s inequality
that for n large enough, we have
P1(m) < 2
−αn+2, P2(m) < 2−αn+2, S(m) < 2−βn+2
for at least a quarter of the messages m. Expurgating the code
Cn to retain only these messages concludes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
A. Achievability
We show next that there exists a sequence of (2nR, n, 2dn)
uniform compression codes {Cn}n∈N∗ such that H(X) is
achievable with a seed length dn scaling as
dn = Θ(υn
√
n), for any {υn}n∈N with lim
n→∞ υn = +∞.
Let 1 > 0,  > 0, n ∈ N, dn ∈ N, R > 0.
Define Mn , 2nR and Mn , J1,MnK. Consider a random
mapping Φ : Xn × Udn → Mn, and its associated decoder
Ψ : Mn × Udn → Xn. Given (m,udn) ∈ Mn × Udn , the
decoder outputs xˆn if it is the unique sequence such that
xˆn ∈ T n1 (X) and Φ(xˆn, udn) = m; otherwise it outputs an
error. We let M , Φ(Xn, Udn), and define Pe , P[Xn 6=
Ψ(Φ(Xn, Udn), Udn)], Ue , V
(
pM , pUMn
)
.
• We first determine a condition over R to ensure
EΦ [Ue] 6 . Note that ∀m ∈Mn,
pM (m) =
∑
xn
∑
u
p(xn, u)1{Φ(xn, u) = m},
hence, on average ∀m ∈ Mn, EΦ [pM (m)] = 2−nR,
which allows us to write
EΦ [Ue]
= EΦ
[∑
m
|pM (m)− EΦ [pM (m)]|
]
6
2∑
i=1
EΦ
[∑
m
∣∣∣p(i)M (m)− EΦ [p(i)M (m)]∣∣∣
]
, (26)
where ∀m ∈Mn, ∀i ∈ J1, 2K,
p
(i)
M (m) =
∑
xn∈Ai
∑
u
p(xn, u)1{Φ(xn, u) = m},
with A1 , T n1 (X) and A2 , Ac1. After some manipula-
tions similar to those used to bound (25), we bound the
second term in (26) as
EΦ
[∑
m
∣∣∣p(2)M (m)− EΦ [p(2)M (m)]∣∣∣] 6 4|X |e−n21µX ,
(27)
with µX = min
x∈supp(PX)
PX(x). Then, we bound the first
term in (26) by Jensen’s inequality
EΦ
[∑
m
∣∣∣p(1)M (m)− EΦ [p(1)M (m)]∣∣∣
]
6
∑
m
√
VarΦ
(
p
(1)
M (m)
)
. (28)
Moreover, after additional manipulations similar to those
used to bound (24), we obtain
VarΦ
(
p
(1)
M (m)
)
=
∑
xn∈T n1 (X)
∑
u
p(xn, u)2VarΦ (1{Φ(xn, u) = m})
6
∑
xn∈T n1 (X)
∑
u
p(xn, u)2EΦ
[
(1{Φ(xn, u) = m})2]
=
∑
xn∈T n1 (X)
∑
u
p(xn, u)2EΦ [1{Φ(xn, u) = m}]
=
∑
xn∈T n1 (X)
∑
u
p(xn)2p(u)22−nR
=
∑
xn∈T n1 (X)
p(xn)22−d2−nR
6
∑
xn∈T n1 (X)
exp2 [−2n(1− 1)H(X)] 2−dn
1
Mn
6 |T n1 (X)|exp2 [−2n(1− 1)H(X)] 2−dn2−nR
6 exp2 [−n(1− 31)H(X)] 2−dn2−nR. (29)
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Thus, by combining (28) and (29), we obtain
EΦ
[∑
m
∣∣∣p(1)M (m)− EΦ [p(1)M (m)]∣∣∣
]
6
∑
m
√
exp2 [−n(1− 31)H(X)] 2−dn2−nR (30)
=
√
Mn exp2
[
−n
2
(
(1− 31)H(X) + dn
n
)]
6 exp2
[
n
2
(
R− (1− 31)H(X)− dn
n
)]
. (31)
Hence, if R < H(X) + dnn − 31H(X), then asymptoti-
cally EΦ [Ue] 6  by (27) and (31).
• We now derive a condition over R to ensure EΦ[Pe] 6 .
We define E0 , {Xn /∈ T n1 (X)}, and E1 , {∃xˆn 6=
Xn,Φ(xˆn, U) = Φ(Xn, U) and xˆn ∈ T n1 (X)} so that
by the union bound, EΦ[Pe] 6 P[E0] + P[E1]. We have
P[E0] 6 2|X |e−n21µX , (32)
and defining P(xn, xˆn, u) , P[∃xˆn 6= xn,Φ(xˆn, u) =
Φ(xn, u) and xˆn ∈ T n1 (X)], we have
P[E1] =
∑
xn
∑
u
p(xn, u)P(xn, xˆn, u)
6
∑
xn
∑
u
p(xn, u)
∑
xˆn∈T n1 (X)
xˆn 6=xn
P[Φ(xˆn, u) = Φ(xn, u)]
=
∑
xn
∑
u
p(xn, u)
∑
xˆn∈T n1 (X)
xˆn 6=xn
2−nR
6
∑
xn
∑
u
p(xn, u)|T n1 (X)|2−nR
6
∑
xn
∑
u
p(xn, u) exp2 [nH(X)(1 + 1)] 2
−nR
6 exp2 [n(H(X)(1 + 1)−R)] . (33)
Hence, if R > H(X) + 1H(X), then asymptotically
EΦ(Pe) 6  by (32) and (33).
All in all, if R is such that
H(X) + 1H(X) < R < H(X) +
dn
n
− 31H(X),
then asymptotically by the selection lemma (e.g. [5, Lemma
2.2]), EΦ[Ue] 6  and EΦ[Pe] 6 . Thus, we choose dn such
that
4n1H(X) < dn 6 4n1H(X) + 1.
We can also choose 1 = υn√n ,
3 for any υn with limn→∞ υn =
+∞, such that
4H(X) <
dn
υn
√
n
6 4H(X) + (
√
nυn)
−1,
which means dn = Θ(υn
√
n). Finally, by means of the selec-
tion lemma applied to Pe and Ue, there exists a realization
of Φ such that Ue 6  and Pe 6 .
3Note that we cannot make 1 decrease faster because of (27) and (32).
B. Converse
We first show that any achievable rate R must satisfy R >
H(X). Assume that R is an achievable rate. We note M ,
φn(X
n, Udn). We have
nR > H(M)
> I(Xn;M |Udn)
= H(Xn|Udn)−H(Xn|MUdn)
(a)
> H(Xn|Udn)− nδ()
(b)
= nH(X)− nδ(),
where (a) holds by Fano’s inequality and (b) holds by inde-
pendence of Xn and Udn .
Hence it remains to show an upper bound for the optimal
scaling of dn. Recall first the Berry-Esse´en Theorem.
Theorem 2 (Berry-Esse´en Theorem). Let {Zi}i∈N be a
sequence of i.i.d. random variables with E[Z1] = µ and
E[(Z1 − µ)2] = σ2Z > 0 and E[|Z1 − µ|3] = ρZ < ∞.
Let Yn = Z1+Z2+···+Zn−nµσZ√n . Let Fn denote the cumulative
distribution function of Yn. Then, for any x ∈ R,
|Fn(x)− Φ(x)|6 αρZ
σ3Z
√
n
, (34)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard
normal distribution with mean zero and variance 1 and α is
a constant that depends only on the distribution of Z1.
Using Theorem 2, we show the following.
Lemma 5. Let {Xi}i∈N be a sequence of i.i.d. random
variables with each distributed according to pX such that
H(X) , −E[log pX(X1)] <∞,
σ2 , E[(log pX(X1) +H(X))2]> 0,
ρ , E[|log pX(X1) +H(X)|3]< ∞.
Then, there exists an α > 0 such that for any a > b > 0,
ηa,b ,
∣∣∣P[Xn ∈ Tn(a, b)]− (Φ(−b)− Φ(−a))∣∣∣ 6 2αρ
σ3
√
n
,
η∞,b ,
∣∣∣P[Xn ∈ Tn(∞, b)]− Φ(−b)∣∣∣ 6 αρ
σ3
√
n
.
where
Tn(a, b) ,
{
xn ∈ Xn : 2
−nH(X)−aσ√n < pX(xn)
2−nH(X)−bσ
√
n > pX(xn)
}
.
Proof: Define Sn ,
nH(X)+
∑n
j=1 log2 pX(Xj)
σ
√
n
. Then,
P[Xn ∈ Tn(a, b)] = P [−a < Sn 6 −b]
= P [Sn 6 −b]− P [Sn 6 −a] .
Hence,
ηa,b , |P[Xn ∈ Tn(a, b)]− (Φ(−b)− Φ(−a))|
(a)
6 |P [Sn 6 −b]− Φ(−b)|+ |P [Sn 6 −a]− Φ(−a)|
(b)
6 2αρ
σ3
√
n
,
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where (a) holds by the triangle inequality, and (b) holds by
Theorem 2. The bound on η∞,b holds similarly.
We will also make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 6. For any φn : Xn × Udn → Mn and for any
γn ∈]0,Mn[,
Ue(φn) > 2
(
P
[
pXn(X
n) >
2dn
γn
]
− γn
Mn
)
.
Proof: Let φn : Xn×Udn →Mn. We apply [49, Lemma
2.1.2] to φn so that for any n ∈ N, for any a, for any Υ > 0
1
2
Ue(φn)
=
1
2
V
(
pφn(Xn,Udn ), pUMn
)
> P[(Xn, Udn) /∈ S′n(a)]− P[UMn ∈ Tn(a+ Υ)]− e−nΥ
= P[Xn /∈ Sn(a− dn/n)]− P[UMn ∈ Tn(a+ Υ)]− e−nΥ,
where
S′n(a)
,
{
(xn, udn) ∈ Xn × Udn :
1
n
log
1
PXnUdn (x
n, udn)
> a
}
=
{
(xn, udn) ∈ Xn × Udn :
1
n
log
1
PXn(xn)
> a− dn
n
}
,
Sn(a) ,
{
xn ∈ Xn : 1
n
log
1
PXn(xn)
> a
}
,
Tn(a) ,
{
u ∈ UMn :
1
n
log
1
PUMn (u)
< a
}
.
For any γn ∈]0,Mn[, we choose Υ , 1n log Mnγn and a ,
1
n log γn, such that a+ Υ =
1
n logMn and P[UMn ∈ Tn(a+
Υ)] = 0. Hence, we obtain
1
2
Ue(φn) > P[Xn /∈ Sn(a− dn/n)]− e−nΥ
= P
[
1
n
log
1
PXn(xn)
< a− dn/n
]
− e−nΥ
= P
[
1
n
log
1
PXn(xn)
<
1
n
log(γn2
−dn)
]
− γn
Mn
.
Proposition 5 (Converse). Let for each n ∈ N, Cn be
an (2nR, n, 2dn) uniform compression code Cn for a DMS
(X , pX) such that
lim
n→∞Pe(φn, ψn) = limn→∞Ue(φn) = 0.
Then, dn = Ω(
√
n).
Proof: Since the encoding function φn of Cn utilizes a
seed Udn taking values in J1, 2dnK that is independent of the
source Xn, we can find u∗dn such that
P[Xn 6= ψn(φn(Xn, u∗dn), u∗dn)] 6 Pe(φn, ψn). (35)
Fix a > b > 0, and define Ln(a, b) as
Ln(a, b) , {xn ∈ Tn(a, b) : xn = ψn(φn(xn, u∗dn), u∗dn)}.
Note that
P[Xn ∈ Ln(a, b)]
> P[Xn ∈ Tn(a, b)]− P[Xn 6= ψn(φn(Xn, u∗dn), u∗dn)]
(a)
> P[Xn ∈ Tn(a, b)]−Pe(φn, ψn)
(b)
> Φ(−b)− Φ(−a)− 2αρ
σ3
√
n
−Pe(φn, ψn)
, υn(a, b),
where (a) follows from (35), and (b) holds by Lemma 5
with σ2, ρ defined therein. Note that for any xn ∈ Ln(a, b),
pX(x
n) 6 2−nH(X)−bσ
√
n. Hence,
|Ln(a, b)|
2nH(X)+bσ
√
n
> P[Xn ∈ Ln(a, b)] > υn(a, b).
Since Ln(a, b) is a subset of source realizations for which
the code offers perfect reconstruction (when the seed used is
Udn = u
∗
dn
), we have
Mn > |Ln(a, b)|> υn(a, b) 2nH(X)+bσ
√
n. (36)
We now use Lemma 6 with
γn , υn(a, b) 2nH(X), Mn > υn(a, b) 2nH(X)+bσ
√
n,
which yields
P
[
pXn(X
n) > 2
dn
γn
]
6 Ue(φn)
2
+
γn
|Mn|
6 Ue(φn)
2
+ 2−bσ
√
n. (37)
From Lemma 5, it follows that
P
[
pXn(X
n) 6 2dnγn
]
= P
[
pXn(X
n) 6 2
dn
υn(a, b) 2nH(X)
]
6 Φ
 log 2dnυn(a,b)
σ
√
n
+ αρ
σ3
√
n
. (38)
Combining (37) and (38), we obtain
Φ
 log 2dnυn(a,b)
σ
√
n
 > βn , 1− Ue(φn)
2
− 2−bσ
√
n − αρ
σ3
√
n
.
Rearranging terms and taking appropriate limit, we get
lim
n→∞
dn
σ
√
n
= Φ−1
(
Φ
(
lim
n→∞
dn
σ
√
n
))
= Φ−1
(
lim
n→∞Φ
(
dn
σ
√
n
))
> Φ−1
(
lim
n→∞βn
)
= Φ−1(1) =∞,
where in the above arguments, we have used the fact that Φ
is invertible, continuous and increasing.
Remark 5. In [2], we prove a converse for i.i.d. sources that
is stronger than Proposition 5. If dn = o(
√
n), then
lim sup
n→∞
Pe(φn, ψn) + lim sup
n→∞
Ue(φn) > 1.
We however do not need this stronger statement for our
purpose.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Let  > 0, δ > 0 and n ∈ N. Let t, m, and dn to be
expressed later. We know from [43], [44] that there exists
an invertible (m, d,m, t, )-extractor EXT0, such that (2) is
satisfied. Assume that the emitter and the receiver share a
sequence Udn of dn uniformly distributed bits. As described
in Figure 5, we proceed in two steps to encode Xn. First,
we perform a compression of Xn to form S based on 0-
letter typical sequences, 0 > 0, we note this operation
φ′n : Xn → M′n, such that S , φ′n(Xn), and we note
ψ′n :M′n → Xn the inverse operation such that
lim
n→∞P[X
n 6= ψ′n ◦ φ′n(Xn)] = 0. (39)
Note that this compression implies
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log|M′n|6 H(X) + δ. (40)
Then, we apply the extractor EXT0 to S and Udn , to form
the encoded message M = EXT0(S,Udn). We define the
encoding function φn : Xn × Udn →Mn as
φn(X
n, Udn) ,M = EXT0(φ′n(Xn), Udn),
and the decoding function ψn :Mn × Udn → Xn as
ψn(M,Udn) , ψ′n(EXT−10 (M,Udn))
= ψ′n(S)
= ψ′n ◦ φ′n(Xn), (41)
which is possible since EXT0 is invertible. Note that by (39),
(41), we have
lim
n→∞P[X
n 6= ψn(φn(Xn, Udn), Udn)]
= lim
n→∞P[X
n 6= ψ′n ◦ φ′n(Xn)]
= 0,
and since the sizes of the first input and output of the extractor
are the same, by (40), we have
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log|M′n|6 H(X) + δ.
Moreover, [43], [44] also shows that Ue 6 . It remains to
show that for any b > 0, we can choose dn , Θ(n1/2+b).
Let 0 > 0. As in the proof of Lemma 1, we may show
H∞(S) = − log(max pS(s))
> n(1− 0)H(X)− log
[
1 +
δ0(n)
1− δ0(n)
]
.
We define
t , n(1− 0)H(X)− log
[
1 +
δ0(n)
1− δ0(n)
]
. (42)
Thus, since the input size m of the extractor verifies m 6
dn(1 + 0)H(X)e, by (2) and (42) we obtain
dn 6 n(1 + 0)H(X)− t+ 2 log[n(1 + 0)H(X)]
+ 2 log
1

+O(1)
= 2n0H(X) + log
[
1 +
δ0(n)
1− δ0(n)
]
+ 2 log[n(1 + 0)H(X)] + 2 log
1

+O(1).
Then, we choose 0 = υn√n , for any υn with limn→∞ υn =
+∞, such that
dn
υn
√
n
6 2H(X) + 2
υn
√
n
log
1

+O
(
log n
υn
√
n
)
,
which means dn = O(υn
√
n).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Let β ∈]0, 1/2[. Let n ∈ N and N , 2n. We set AN ,
XNGN . We define the following sets.
VX ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (Ai|Ai−1) > 1− δN} ,
HX ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (Ai|Ai−1) > δN} .
These sets cardinalities satisfy the following properties.
Lemma 7. The sets HX and VX satisfy
1) limN→+∞|HX |/N = H(X),
2) limN→+∞|VX |/N = H(X),
3) limN→+∞|HX\VX |/N = 0.
Proof: 1) follows from [45] and [50]. 2) follows from
[51, Lemma 1] which also uses [50]. 3) holds by 1) and 2)
since VX ⊂ HX .
Lemma 8. The output of the encoder AN [VX ] is near
uniformly distributed with respect to the Kullback-Leibler
divergence.
Proof: We have
H
(
AN [VX ]
)
=
∑
i∈VX
H
(
Ai|Ai−1[VX ]
)
>
∑
i∈VX
H
(
Ai|Ai−1
)
> |VX |(1− δN ) ,
where the first inequality holds because conditioning reduces
entropy and the last inequality follows from the definition of
VX . We thus obtain
log 2|VX | −H(AN [VX ]) 6 |VX |δN 6 NδN .
Finally, by [45], the receiver can reconstruct XN from
AN [VX ] and I0 , AN [HX\VX ], where I0 is encrypted via a
one-time pad with the uniform seed shared by Alice and Bob.
Hence, by Lemmas 7, 8, we obtain a polar code construction
for a uniform compression code, whose seed length scales
as o(N).
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